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Part 1.
Proceedings of the Joint Committees
Senator Bill Lockyer introduced Senate Constitutional Amendment 3
on December 7, 1992. SCA 3 "would eliminate the provisions for superior,
municipal, and justice courts, and instead provide for district courts, their
establishment and jurisdiction, and the qualification and election of judges
thereof. The measure would become operative on July 1, 1995. The
measure would also specify its purposes, and make related, conforming
changes." (SCA 3, Legislative Counsel's Digest)
Senator Lockyer invited the Judicial Council to comment on SCA 3.
In February 1993, the Judicial Council Policy Coordination Committee
referred the issue of trial court unification to the Trial Court Presiding
Judges Standing Advisory Committee and the Court Administrators
Standing Advisory Committee. Those two committees agreed in April to
establish a joint sub-committee. The membership of these committees is
provided in attachment 1. In creating the Joint Sub-Committee, the
committees envisioned a process that would:
(1) be inclusive in gathering input from a variety of courts (large
and small; municipal, justice and superior; urban and rural), other
Judicial Council committees, court administrators, and bar
representatives;
(2) identify issues that need to be addressed to formulate a trial
court unification proposal;
(3) seek to reach consensus as to how each of those issues should
most appropriately be addressed; and
(4) reduce that consensus to specific proposed constitutional
amendments.
At the April Court Management Conference, a brainstorming session
on SCA 3 identified the following twenty-six issues for further
consideration:
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1. Boundaries of court districts and electoral districts
2. Provision for mandating adequate funding
3. Judicial qualification of 5 or 10 years
4. Grandparent provision
5. Selection/retention of judges
6. Appeal process (including 995, small claims de novo)
7. Phase-in process
8. Allocation of judicial resources to courts and branches
9. Funding retirement plans
10. Specialized courts within branch courts
11. Power of assignment (assignment to court outside electoral
district?)
12. Equalization of judicial pay
13. Composition of Judicial Council
14. Authority of legislature in rule-making
15. Reference to County Clerk
16. Seniority for assignments
17. Judicial district of more than one county
18. Preserve local control of bench officer selection vs. broader
basis
19. Juror selection - definition of district
20. Voting Rights Act implications
21. Merit selection for judges
22. Equalize retirements, benefits for judges
23. Parameters of constitution, statute, statewide rule, local rules
24. How to define branch court? Who decides where branches are?
25. Relationship and role of Chief Justice, Judicial Council, and
AOC
26. Who will be responsible for facilities?
By letter of April 26, 1993, to all Presiding Judges and Executive
Officers of the Superior, Municipal, and Justice Courts, Chief Justice
Lucas circulated this list of issues and invited further comments and
suggestions.
The Joint Sub-Committee established a Steering Committee to guide
the review process. In May and June, the Steering Committee held a series
of meetings, including meetings with chairs of other committees, a meeting
with several voting rights experts, and a special meeting on the appellate
process. The Joint Sub-Committee met on June 9 to seek consensus on the
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policy issues raised by trial court unification. The Steering Committee also
retained the services of the Reporter to assist in preparation of this report.
A draft of this report was submitted to the Presiding Judges and Court
Administrators Standing Advisory Committees for their consideration on
July 15-16, 1993. At that time, the draft report, as amended, was jointly
adopted by the two committees. The two committees also determined that
the draft report, as amended and adopted, should be distributed as soon as
possible to all trial judges and court administrators, and other interested
persons, for comment.
The two committees met again jointly on August 20, 1993, to consider
further action on the draft report in light of the comments received. After
reviewing each of the general recommendations in light of the comments
received, the Joint Committee voted as follows: (1) to adopt this final
Report and forward it to the Judicial Council for its consideration, (2) to
recommend that the Judicial Council support amendments to SCA 3
consistent with this Report, (3) to recommend that the Judicial Council
support referral of SCA 3 (as well as proposed implementing legislation)
to the Law Revision Commission for its review and comment, and (4) to
recommend that the Judicial Council support SCA 3 if it is amended
consistent with this Report.
The proposed constitutional amendments and commentary in Part 3 of
this document are primarily the work product of the Trial Court Presiding
Judges and Court Administrators Standing Advisory Committees. The
Appellate Standing Advisory Committee, with the Honorable Marvin R.
Baxter, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California, serving as
Chair, and the Appellate Courts Committee of the California Judges
Association, with the Honorable Norman L. Epstein, Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, serving as Chair,
were ultimately responsible for drafting Sections 10 and 11 dealing with
original and appellate jurisdiction, respectively.
At its meeting on September 23, the Judicial Council decided to adopt
the amendments recommended by the Presiding Judges and Court
Administrators Committees with only a single modification (regarding
composition of the Judicial Council), to seek legislative action to so amend
SCA 3, and to refer the proposed constitutional amendments to the Law
Revision Commission for review and comment.
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The Council has taken no position on the broader issue of whether to
support trial court unification. The decision in September was limited to
a recommendation that SCA 3 be amended by the Legislature prior to
passage. It is anticipated the Council will not take a position on the merits
of trial court unification until, at the earliest, its meeting on November 30,
1993, and a final decision may be delayed until early 1994. A report from
the Law Revision Commission is expected in February 1994 as well.
Part 2.
General Recommendations
This part contains, in list form, the recommendations adopted jointly
by the Presiding Judges and Court Administrators Standing Advisory
Committees on August 20, 1993, and approved, as amended, by the
Judicial Council on September 23. Specific proposed constitutional
amendments to implement the constitutional recommendations and
commentary in support appear in part 3. Some of the recommendations
below do not require constitutional amendment and would be implemented,
if at all, through legislation or rules of court. Work has already begun on
drafting implementing legislation. It is anticipated that the implementing
legislation will be reviewed by appropriate committees of the Judicial
Council and by the Law Revision Commission.
Constitutional Recommendations
1. The superior, municipal and justice courts shall be merged into one
trial level court, called the district court, whose electoral district and
jurisdictional boundaries shall be the same as the county within which the
district court is located. (Cal. Const., Art. -VI, § 1)
2. There shall be one type of trial level judge, called a district court
judge. As of the effective date of the amendments, all existing superior,
municipal and justice court judges shall become district court judges and
shall serve out the balance of their current terms as district court judges.
(Effective Date provision)
3. To qualify for service as a district court judge, a person shall have
been a member of the State Bar for 10 years prior to selection, except that
sitting municipal and justice court judges shall be exempt from the
requirement. (Cal. Const., Art. VI, §§ 15 & 15.5)
4. Terms of district court judges s'hall be 6 years. The Governor shall
fill vacancies by appointment until the elected judge's term begins. A
vacancy shall be filled by election to a full term at the next general
election after the third January 1 following the vacancy. (Cal. Const., Art.
VI, § 16(c))
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5. The district court shall select an executive officer to serve as clerk
of the court. (See removal of language regarding county clerk in Cal.
Const., Art. VI, § 4)
6. The court of appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction over Category
One causes, and the district court sliall have appellate jurisdiction over
Category Two causes. The categorization of causes shall be determined by
a special Rule of Court promulgated by the Judicial Council and approved
by a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court. Initially, this Rule of
Court shall categorize all causes presently within the jurisdiction of the
municipal and justice courts as Category Two causes, and all other causes
shall be categorized as Category One causes. (Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 11)
7. Extraordinary writs to review Category One causes shall be heard
by the court of appeal, and extraordinary writs to review Category Two
causes shall be heard by the district court. (Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 10)
8. In Category One civil causes, the jury shall consist of 12 persons or
a lesser number agreed on by the parties. In Category Two civil causes,
the Legislature may provide that the jury shall consist of eight persons or
a lesser number agreed on by the parties. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 16)
9. The Judicial Council shall be the policy-making body for the courts
and shall have power to promulgate rules of court administration whether
or not such rules are consistent with statute. The Chief Justice shall be the
chief executive officer for the courts and shall implement the rules
promulgated by the Judicial Council. The Council shall consist of the
Chief Justice, who shall be the presiding officer, one other justice of the
Supreme Court, 3 justices of courts of appeal, 10 judges of district courts,
2 non-voting court administrators, and such other non-voting members as
determined by the Council, each appointed by the Chief Justice for a 3-
year term pursuant to procedures established by the Council, 4 members
of the State Bar appointed by its governing body for 3-year terms, and 1
member from each house of the Legislature appointed as provided by the
Legislature. (Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 6)
10. The proposed constitutional amendments shall become effective on
July 1, 1995. (Effective Date provision)
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Statutory Recommendations
11. District court judge salaries shall be set by statute, and all district
court judges shall receive the same salary. As of the effective date of the
amendments, the salary shall be equal to the salary for superior court
judges.
12. The retirement rights and benefits of sitting and retired judges shall
not be diminished by reason of unification. A municipal court judge who
has retired prior to unification should receive retirement benefits based on
91% of the salary of a sitting district court judge (which represents the
present salary differential between superior court judges and municipal and
justice court judges). The details of the retirement plan need further study
by the Judicial Council.
13. No judgeships shall be eliminated as a result of unification. Any
reallocation of judicial resources between districts shall be accomplished
in accord with recommendations by the Judicial Council in light of the
results of the pending judicial needs study and the need for flexibility in
the use of assigned judges.
14. The district court shall have the authority to establish the location
of court facilities.
Rule of Court Recommendations
15. By rules of court, a judge shall be allowed to continue to hear
matters for which he or she was elected or appointed until the end of the
judge's term or five years after the effective date of the amendments,
whichever is longer.
16. All district court judges who preside in districts which have an
insufficient caseload to fully support the number of available judicial
officers shall be subject to assignment to other courts.
17. Venue and vicinage within the district shall be determined by local
court rule.
Part 3.
Proposed Amendments to the California
Constitution and Commentary
This part contains specific proposed amendments to the California
Constitution to achieve trial court unification. The Judicial Article of the
Constitution, Article VI, is reproduced in full with suggested amendments.
Three other sections in the Constitution (not in Article VI) refer to
superior, municipal or justice courts, and amendments for those three
sections are also proposed. In the provisions below, existing language is
printed in regular typeface, additions are printed in italics, and deletions
are marked by str-ikeeets.
Effective Date
These amendments shall take effect on July 1, 1995. On that date, every
superior, municipal and justice court judge shall immediately become a
district court judge and shall serve out the remaining time of his or her
term.
Comment
a. A variety of effective date and transition periods were considered,
ranging from a six-month transition period to a two-year period in which
individual districts could certify readiness to unify at any time within the
two-year period. The general purpose of a transition period is to give local
judicial officials time to make preparations for unification. Some counties,
especially those counties which have vigorous trial court coordination
plans, will be ready to unify almost immediately. Other counties may
require more time. Ultimately, it was determined that a single effective
date was the only practical solution. Having some counties unify before
other counties would create state-wide confusion among the bench, the bar
and the public. July 1, 1995, was chosen because it coincides with the
courts' budget cycle. Assuming the constitutional amendments are
approved in the June 1994 election, trial courts will have over one year to
prepare for unification. It was agreed that one year should be adequate
time for court administrators to make all necessary preparations. July 1994
was ruled out both because not all trial courts would be ready so quickly
1993 / Trial Court Unification: Proposed Amendments and Commentary
and because the necessary implementing legislation will likely not be




Section 16. Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured
to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a
verdict. A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of
both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the
defendant's counsel. In a civil cause a jury may be waived by the
consent of the parties expressed as prescribed by statute.
In Category One civil causes the jury shall consist of 12 persons or
a lesser number agreed on by the parties in open court. In Category
Two civil causes in-uiipa-ei--justiee-eoi-t the Legislature may
provide that the jury shall consist of eight persons or a lesser number
agreed on by the parties in open court. All causes shall be assigned to
Category One or Category Two as provided in Article VI, Section 11.
In criminal actions in which a felony is charged, the jury shall
consist of 12 persons. In criminal actions in which a misdemeanor is
charged, the jury shall consist of 12 persons or a lesser number agreed
on by the parties in open court.
Comment
a. Right to a Jury. The first paragraph of this section expresses .the
constitutional right to a jury in criminal and civil actions. The proposed
amendments to this section are not intended in any way to affect the
interpretation of the first paragraph.
b. Size of Jury. Presently, the Constitution expresses a clear preference
for a 12-person jury in all cases. A 12-person jury is mandated in felony
cases, and a smaller jury is permitted in misdemeanor and all civil cases
only with the consent of the parties. The Legislature is authorized to
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provide for an 8-person jury only in civil causes within the jurisdiction of
municipal and justice courts.
As amended, this section will continue the preference for a 12-person
jury. A 12-person jury will still be mandated in all felony cases, and a
smaller jury will be permitted in misdemeanor actions only with the
consent of the parties. In order to retain the existing flexibility in
determining the size of the civil jury, the Legislature is authorized to
provide for a smaller jury by statute in Category Two civil cases. The
categorization of causes is provided for in Article VI, Section 11. As of
the effective date of these amendments, all causes within the jurisdiction
of the municipal and justice courts will be declared Category Two causes,
and all causes within the jurisdiction of the superior courts will be declared
Category One causes. As a consequence, this amendment will result in no
change to the constitutionally provided size of the civil jury.
Article V
The Executive Branch
Section 13. Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the
Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be
the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are
uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall have
direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over
such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in
all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may
require any of said officers to make reports concerning the
investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may seem
advisable. Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law
of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be
the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of
which the sitpe4o district court shall have jurisdiction, and in such
cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district
attorney. When required by the public interest or directed by the
Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district attorney in the
discharge of the duties of that office.
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Comment
a. This amendment slightly increases the Attorney General's
responsibility and power in situations where the Attorney General is of the
opinion that the "law of the State is not being adequately enforced."
Presently, the Attorney General's power and responsibility to prosecute
violations of law as a district attorney extends only to those criminal
violations within the jurisdiction of the superior court. This limitation
excludes misdemeanors, which fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal
and justice courts. The amendment will bring misdemeanors within the
scope of the Attorney General's power and responsibility. There is no
reason in principle why the Attorney General should not be responsible to




Section 1. The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme
Court, courts of appeal, superr ceourts, ma ieip-a!eurs -a-justie
eoufts and district courts. All courts are courts of record.
Comment
a. The Core Function of the Judicial Branch and the Importance of the
Trial Courts. "The primary purpose of the public judiciary is "to afford a
forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties."'
(Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 281)
In 1991-92, well over 16 million disputes were filed in California's courts.
Over ninety percent (15.2 million) of those cases were filed in the 90
municipal and 53 justice courts, staffed by around 660 of California's
1,553 authorized judgeships. Another million cases were filed in the 58
superior courts (which have around 790 judges).
Disputes are initially decided (and in the vast majority of cases, finally
decided) by the trial courts, which makes the work of the trial courts of
paramount importance to the public and to the judiciary. For most
251
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Californians, their only direct contact with the Judicial Branch occurs at
the trial court level. Although one traffic infraction may appear to the
courts little different from the 6 million other traffic infractions processed
during the year, from the defendant's perspective, that one traffic infraction
may be an important case and may be that person's only contact during the
year with the Judicial Branch.
The trial courts are responsible for giving each case the process and
attention it is due and for rendering a correct decision on the merits. Public
confidence in the judicial system requires nothing less. The ultimate goal
must be to make the justice system accessible and responsive to all
persons, whether the case involves $500 or $50,000, and whether the
criminal penalty is a $100 fine or many years in prison. Trial courts must
have the flexibility to respond appropriately to each case, allocating the
right amount of judicial resources to render correct decisions. Judicial
resources are a scarce commodity and must be efficiently allocated. If too
little is allocated to particular cases, there is a higher risk of an incorrect
decision. And, if too much is allocated to particular cases, other cases are
likely to be squeezed by the system.
Trial court organization plays a significant role in how judicial
resources are allocated, in how disputes are resolved, and in how the
public perceives the justice system. Under our current system,
misdemeanors, traffic infractions, small civil disputes, small claims cases,
and preliminary hearings in felony proceedings are diverted to the
municipal and justice courts for processing, and all other cases fall within
the jurisdiction of the superior courts. This system, which has worked
tolerably well for over forty years, is showing signs of strain.
Filings in the superior court have risen 39% from 1982-83 figures.
(California Judicial Council, 1993 Annual Report, Volume II, p. 44) Over
the same period, the total number of superior court judges has increased
only 22%. (Ld., p. 45) Increased filings do not accurately measure
increased workload since different cases demand different amounts of
judicial time, and there has been a significant increase in case complexity,
especially in civil cases filed in the superior court. Nevertheless, the
increase in filings can give a rough sense of the difficulties being faced by
our trial level courts in recent years. The gap between the percent increase
in filings and increase in judges has been partially filled by adding more
subordinate judicial officers. There has been a 44% increase in the number
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of commissioners and referees. (Ld.) But even with this increase, there has
been only a 25% increase in the total number of judicial positions. (Id., p.
44) To close the gap further, courts have been forced to assign retired
judges and municipal court judges to superior court service. (Ld., p. 98)
These efforts resulted in a 36% increase in the total number of judicial
position equivalents over the past decade, which is close to, but still below,
the 39% increase in the number of filings. (Ld., p. 44)
The municipal and justice courts are also feeling the strain, partly as
a result of cross-assignments of these judges to the superior court. During
the last decade, excluding parking, there was a 12% increase in filings in
the municipal and justice courts. (Ld., pp. 86 & 90) Authorized judgeships
increased 21% during this period, and adding in commissioners and
referees, the municipal and justice courts experienced a 34% increase in
judicial position equivalents. (Ld., p. 84) Yet much of this additional
personpower was directed to the superior courts through judicial
assignments. In 1991-92, municipal and justice court judges spent 2,780
judicial days sitting on assignment in superior courts. (Ld., p. 98)
Moreover, superior and municipal court coordination programs have further
blurred the jurisdictional responsibilities of superior and municipal court
judges.
Notwithstanding the filing increases, no new judgeships have been
authorized since 1987, creating an atmosphere of crisis within the Judicial
Branch. To deal with the rising tide, courts have turned to alternative
dispute resolution programs, trial court coordination, traffic court reforms,
and trial court delay reduction efforts. Yet these programs are not enough.
As Chief Justice Lucas has noted, "One of the fundamental principles
upheld by a responsive justice system is that the public court system must
have adequate resources to perform its constitutional role. By resources,
I do not mean only financial support. I include the authority to handle the
affairs of the judicial system, to set a course for the future, and to meet
needs in an environment where fiscal resources are unlikely to match
increases in demand."
Simply put, trial court unification, as proposed in this report, will
maximize judicial control over the single most important component of the
judicial system - the trial courts. Eliminating the artificial jurisdictional
boundary between superior courts and municipal and justice courts will
make it possible for presiding judges more easily to handle the daily
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
affairs of the trial courts, for the Judicial Council more readily to set a
course for the future of the trial courts, and for all judges in California to
contribute to the operational efficiencies necessary to meet the increasing
demand.
b. The Fundamental Principles of Modern Court Organization. The
modern organization of the courts has been studied by some of the leading
legal figures of the century. Roscoe Pound, long-time dean of the Harvard
Law School, made court reorganization one of the centerpieces of his
distinguished career, beginning with his famous 1906 address to the
American Bar Association (The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice reprinted in 46 J. Amer. Judicature Soc. 55
(1962)) and culminating in the publication of his influential book on the
subject, Organization of Courts (1940). Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, was another early leader in the
reorganization movement. See, e.g., Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Minimum
Standards of Judicial Administration (1949). His works, along with the
efforts particularly of Chief Judge John J. Parker of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, led to the 1937 adoption of
standards of judicial administration by the Judicial Administration Division
of the American Bar Association.
Roscoe Pound identified four general principles to guide court
reorganization efforts: unification, flexibility, conservation of judicial
power, and responsibility. He explained these principles as follows:
Unification is called for in order to concentrate the machinery of
justice upon its tasks, flexibility in order to enable it to meet
speedily and efficiently the continually varying demands made
upon it, responsibility in order that some one may always be held
and clearly stand out as the official to be held if the judicial
organization is not functioning the most efficiently that the law and
the nature of its tasks permit. Conservation of judicial power is a
sine qua non of efficiency under the circumstances of the time.
Organization of Courts supra pp. 275-76.
Pound's principles remain the guiding beacon of reorganization efforts.
The 1990 Standards of Judicial Administration promulgated by the Judicial
Administration Division of the American Bar Association provides in its
very first section as follows, essentially reaffirming Pound's observations:
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The organization of a court system should serve the courts' basic
task of determining cases justly, promptly, effectively, and
efficiently. To this end, the organizational structure should promote
judicial accountability, authority over all judicial operations, clear
delineation between judicial and nonjudicial responsibilities, and
common management systems so that the delivery of services may
be administered uniformly throughout the jurisdiction. ABA
Standards of Judicial Administration, § 1.00.
In explaining SCA 3, Senator Lockyer drew upon these same
principles. He has noted that the historical need for multiple levels of
widely-dispersed local trial courts was "predicated upon distance being a
burden and judicial wisdom a sparse commodity to be reserved for
complicated cases. [ ] As fashioned for an agrarian and low-mobility
society, the system made sense. It may now be archaic. It is certainly
costly, in its duplication of administrative offices and its inefficiency in
distributing judicial talents. Its jurisdictional lines have been blurred by
upward adjustments in the monetary limits of the municipal court, by the
emergence of crimes as 'wobblers' and the process of plea bargaining the
charge of an offense, and in widespread cross-assignment of judges for
caseload efficiency. Location is of less importance with current technology
available, and with the urban concentration of people to be served. And the
superior and municipal judicial cadres are perhaps now less differentiated
by their inherent experience and skills than by the happenstance of the
appointment process and the positions available."
Thus, in recommending unification of California's three trial-level
courts into one district court, the Judicial Council breaks no new ground.
To the contrary, unification is the next logical step in more than a century
of efforts to simplify and rationalize trial court jurisdiction in California,
and California's Commission on the Future of the Courts has assumed in
its deliberations that by the year 2020, California's trial courts will have
unified. The fact that unification is also likely to result in significant
efficiencies, with concomitant budgetary implications, makes it all the
more attractive.
c. The History of Court Organization in California. Following the
prevailing practice of the times, the 1849 California Constitution created
and authorized a multiplicity of trial courts (Constitution of 1849, Art. VI,
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§ 1): district courts; county courts; probate courts; justice of the peace
courts; courts of session; municipal courts; and tribunals for conciliation.
The constitutional convention of 1878 saw the first proposal to unify
all trial level courts into a single trial court. That proposal was rejected,
however, in favor of a more modest consolidation of county and district
courts into superior courts. (Constitution of 1879, Art. VI, § 1) The 1879
Constitution retained justice courts hnd provided for the legislative
establishment of other inferior courts. (Ld.)
The other inferior courts were not long in coming. Small claims courts
were established in 1921. Justice courts were divided into Class A and
Class B courts. Municipal courts were similarly divided into two branches.
Local government created police and city courts. By 1949, there were 767
court systems with jurisdiction inferior to the superior court and eight
different types of inferior courts.
This patchwork of courts with overlapping jurisdictions and limited
coordination was replaced in 1950 when the voters approved a
constitutional amendment, Proposition 3, recommended by the Judicial
Council. The 1950 amendment, which provides the basis for our current
trial court system, authorized only superior, municipal and justice courts.
Each county had a superior court. Municipal courts were created in
districts with a population of more than 40,000, and justice courts were
created in districts with a population of 40,000 or less.
The 1950 reorganization eliminated the power vested in the cities and
counties to create new types of inferior courts, and the Legislature was
given the responsibility to prescribe the jurisdiction of municipal and
justice courts. The Legislature was also given the responsibility to
prescribe the number, qualifications and compensation of judges, officers,
and employees of the municipal court. With respect to justice courts, the
Legislature had only to "provide" for the number, qualifications and
compensation of judges, officers, and employees, and the Legislature
delegated that task to the counties.
The implementing legislation provided, among other things, that
municipal courts had jurisdiction of misdemeanors (Penal Code § 1462)
and civil cases in which the amount in controversy was $3,000 or less
(C.C.P. § 89). Justice courts had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
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failure to provide for a minor child (Penal Code § 1425) and civil cases
involving $500 or less (C.C.P. § 112).
Passage of the implementing legislation was secured only by
compromising with local government on a number of issues. Among the
most significant compromises:
1. Retention of part-time judicial positions and lay judges in
rural areas;
2. County boards of supervisors were given discretion to set the
number and boundaries of the lower court districts within the
county, subject only to constitutional requirements regarding the
size of the district and a requirement that no district boundary
could divide a city (a requirement ultimately amended to exclude
San Diego County);
3. Creation of a legislatively-based revenue distribution system
which gave cities a substantial share of court revenue; and
4. County governments, which accepted the burden of court
financing, were given the authority for judicial districting decisions,
retained local control over justice court staffing, and shared in a
portion of court revenue.
As can be seen in the graph below, there has been a steady reduction
in the total number of municipal and justice court districts in California
from the high point of 767 in 1948. The 1950 amendment reduced the
number to 400, and consolidations (often because of increasing population
within a district) have reduced the number to 143 in 1992, with 10
additional justice courts anticipating consolidation by January 1994.
Along with a reduction in the number of lower trial courts, there has
been a rationalization of their jurisdiction, and the practical distinctions
between municipal and justice courts all but vanished in the 1970's. In
Gordon v. Justice Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 323, 334, the court held that due
process requires a justice court judge to be an attorney (rather than a lay
person) in criminal cases where the defendant faces the possibility of a jail
sentence. As a result of this holding, the Legislature enacted provisions
which eliminated lay judges from the justice courts. (1974 Cal. Stat. ch.
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1493) And in 1976, the Legislature eliminated the differences in
jurisdiction exercised by justice and municipal courts. (1976 Cal. Stat. ch.
1288) Both courts now exercise identical jurisdiction. (C.C.P. § 83) The
State also began participating in payment of compensation for justice court
judges, and justice court judges' salaries were equalized with municipal
court judge salaries.
d. Recent Unification Proposals for California. After the 1950
constitutional amendment, interest in trial court unification subsided and
did not revive until the 1970's, when Assemblyman James A. Hayes, in
1970, introduced legislation to create a unified trial level court. (ACA
64/AB 2397) As a result of this renewed interest, in April of 1970 the
Judicial Council commissioned Booz, Allen & Hamilton, a nationally-
recognized management consulting firm, to study the feasibility of creating
a unified trial court. The study concluded that "[a] single-level trial court
with one type of judge is ultimately the most desirable form of trial court
organization." Booz, Allen & Hamilton, California Unified Trial Court
Feasibility Study p. v (1971) (hereinafter Feasibility Study). The study
proposed a three-stage process for achieving total unification:
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1. Enact statutory and rule changes to consolidate municipal and
justice courts into one inferior court, and create a unified
administrative structure for the superior and inferior courts;
2. Enact constitutional, legislative and rule changes to unify
superior and inferior courts with provision, as necessary, for two
levels of judges within that court; and
3. Enact legislative and rule changes to create a single trial-level
court with one type of judge.
(Feasibility Study, pp. 68-73)
Trial court unification was strongly endorsed and supported in the 1975
Report of the Advisory Commission to the Joint Committee on the
Structure of the Judiciary-To Meet Tomorrow: The Need for Change
(hereinafter Cobey Report). The Advisory Commission, with Justice James
A. Cobey as its chairperson, recommended "that the superior, municipal
and justice courts of each county of this state be merged into a single trial
court." (Cobey Report, Letter of Transmittal, p. 1) In support of its
recommendation, the Advisory Commission noted that unification would
have the following beneficial effects, among others: Offer the maximum
flexibility in the assignment of judges to cases, and vice versa; provide
greater opportunity for judges to specialize in certain types of cases; offer
the maximum flexibility in the use of nonjudicial personnel of the courts;
eliminate unnecessary duplication in administrative functions; allow better
use of facilities; better serve the people regularly using the courts; and,
provide better service to the public generally. (Cobey Report, pp. 10-18)
In the years following the Feasibility Study and the Cobey Report,
court unification amendments were regularly proposed in the Legislature,
but none was enacted.
1971: ACA 45/AB 1400 (Hayes) (unify all trial courts)
SCA 37/SB 619 (Cologne) (unify superior and municipal
courts)
1972: ACA 20/ABs 159 and 160 (Hayes) (unify all trial courts)
SCA 15/SBs 296 & 297 (Judicial Council) (unify municipal and
justice courts)
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SCA 41/SB 852 (Select Committee on Trial Court Delay)
(unify all trial courts)
SCA 57/SB 1152 (Amer. Board of Trial Advocates) (unify
municipal and justice courts)
1973: ACA 71/AB 1900 (Fenton) (unify all trial courts at local
option)
ACA 74/AB 2072 (Kapiloff) (unify all trial courts)
1975: AB 1414/AB 2304 (Miller) (unify municipal and justice courts)
ACA 60 (Fenton) (unify all trial courts at local option)
1976: SCA 48/SB 1500 (Song) (unify all trial courts)
1977: SCA 52/SB 1313 (Song) (unify all trial courts with phase-in)
1981: ACA 36/Proposition 10 (unify all trial courts at local option)
I
The only proposal to make it out of the Legislature, Proposition 10
(1981), which authorized counties to unify superior, municipal and justice
courts, failed at the polls.
e. Administrative Unification Efforts. Recognizing in 1971 there was
resistance to court unification, the Booz, Allen & Hamilton study also
recommended a number of interim alternatives to unification that did not
require legislative action or constitutional amendments. These alternatives
focused largely upon administrative coordination:
1. Unifying only the administrative functions of the lower and
Superior Court levels through the use of a centralized judicial
management structure.
2. Unifying some or all of the activities and resources which
support the judicial services of these courts, such as [bailiff
services], common jury pools, court reporters, court clerks, data
processing systems, financial management, secretarial and other
support functions.
3. Unifying the types of judges and subordinate judicial officers
who render judicial services as well as their jurisdictional levels, in
terms of types of cases.
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4. [Combining] two or more of the three unification approaches
outlined above.
(Feasibility Study pp. 49-50)
These interim measures proved more successful in the legislative
process. The Legislature authorized multi-district bailiff services provided
by the county sheriff or by a marshal with county-wide jurisdiction. (See,
p Gov't Code § 72640) Municipal court reporters, deputy clerks and
deputy marshals were permitted to serve in superior courts. (Gov't Code
§ 68546) Municipal court jurors were drawn from panels selected and
qualified by the superior court jury commissioner. (C.C.P. § 203.1) Official
reporters of the superior court were assigned to act pro tempore as official
reporters of the municipal or justice courts. (Gov't Code § 69957)
In 1980, the Judicial Council released its Final Report of the Court
Administration Consolidation Project. Building upon the 1970's legislative
successes, the Final Report recommended "that each court administrator be
urged to examine the operations of his court together with those of
adjacent court districts in light of the information contained in the report
to determine whether or not there is an opportunity to reduce costs and
improve services by means of the consolidation of one or more
administrative services." Final Report, p. 31.
Throughout the 1980's, trial courts around the state began
experimenting with administrative consolidation and coordination. The
successes achieved by the ad hoc experiments culminated with passage of
the Trial Court Realignment and Efficiency Act of 1991. (1991 Cal. Stat.
ch. 90) Among other things, the Act mandated "trial court coordination
plan[s] designed to achieve maximum utilization of judicial and other court
resources and statewide cost reductions in court operations of at least 3
percent in the 1992-93 fiscal year, a further 2 percent in the 1993-94 fiscal
year, and a further 2 percent in the 1994-95 fiscal year." (Gov't Code §
68112(a)) The Act contained an illustrative list of coordination activities:
(1) The use of blanket cross-assignments allowing judges to hear
civil, criminal, or other types of cases within the jurisdiction of another
court.
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 25
(2) The coordinated or joint use of subordinate judicial officers to
hear or try matters.
(3) The coordinated, joint use, sharing or merger of court support
staff among trial courts within a county or across counties. In a county
with a population of less than 100,000 the coordination plan need not
involve merger of superior and justice court staffs if the court can
reasonably demonstrate that the maintenance of separate administrative
staffs would be more cost effective and provide better service.
(4) The assignment of civil, criminal, or other types of cases for
hearing or trial, regardless of jurisdictional boundaries, to any available
judicial officer.
(5) The assignment of any type of case to a judge for all purposes
commencing with the filing of the case and regardless of jurisdictional
boundaries.
(6) The establishment of separate calendars or divisions to hear a
particular type of case.
(7) In rural counties, the use of all court facilities for hearings and
trials of all types of cases and to accept for filing documents in any
case before any court in the county participating in the coordination
plan.
(8) The coordinated or joint use of alternative dispute resolution
programs such as arbitration.
(9) The unification of the trial courts within a county to the
maximum extent permitted by the Constitution.
(Gov't Code § 68112(b))
All trial level courts submitted coordination plans, and significant
aspects of trial court administrative and judicial functions have already
been effectively consolidated as a result of the coordination plans. For
example, ninety-three percent of the trial courts now report cross-
assignment of judges as necessary to handle the work flow. Eighty-nine
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percent now coordinate the use of support staff. Eighty percent coordinate
case calendars. Seventy-eight percent share common jury pools.
Administrative coordination and cross-assignment of judges are only
temporary fixes, however. In the long run, it is not efficient to have one
court executive reporting to two different courts. There must be a single
source of direction and control from the court to a single executive officer.
Long-term administrative coordination is thus not practical without
unifying the policy-making function, and the policy-making function
cannot be fully unified unless all affected judges have equal access to
policy-making and are treated with equal dignity. Likewise, effective
utilization of judicial resources ultimately requires unified judicial
management of those resources. Court unification addresses these longer
term structural issues.
f. Fiscal Implications. Unification will undoubtedly have fiscal
implications, some positive and some negative. The Legislature is already
on record with a "find[ing] and declar[ation] that the efficiencies that
would result from the enactment and adoption of Senate Constitutional
Amendment 3 of the 1993-94 Regular Session would yield substantial cost
savings to both counties and the State." (SB 86, § 10)
It is difficult to calculate precisely what the overall fiscal impact will
be, because the justice system is in a constant state of flux, and assigning
particular expenditures or savings to trial court unification can be a
somewhat arbitrary process. For example, should savings associated with
improved administrative coordination in the 1980's be included as a
savings associated with unification? On the one hand, administrative
consolidation is one of the main aspects of trial court unification. On the
other hand, administrative coordination can be achieved-and is already
being achieved to a substantial extent-without trial court unification,
although as noted above, long-term administrative coordination is not fully
successful absent unification of the courts.
Putting aside these questions, certain long-term costs and savings are
readily foreseeable. For example, all district court judges will be paid the
same salary, and the salary will be set at the amount presently paid to
superior court judges. The salary for a municipal and justice court judge
is $90,680. The salary for a superior court judge is $99,297. Elevating the
660 municipal and justice court judges to the salary level of a superior
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court judge will result in an annual increase in judicial salaries of
approximately $5.7 million (660 times ($99,297-$90,680)). In addition,
sitting municipal and justice court judges who become judges of the
district court will be entitled to retirement benefits based upon district
judge salaries. The standing committees have insufficient information to
estimate this future cost.
Based on the experience of those counties which have coordinated the
provision of judicial services most fully, these particular increases will be
offset by the costs avoided through reducing the need for additional
judgeships. Counties that have already consolidated their superior and
municipal court benches report significantly more efficient use of available
judicial resources which directly translates into a reduced need to create
more judgeships. For example, Presiding Judge Roger K. Warren of the
consolidated Sacramento Superior and Municipal Courts reports that in the
first six months during which the trial courts have been consolidated in
Sacramento, the increased flexibility made possible through an extensive
program of cross-assignment and consolidation of the assignment function
under the direction of a single presiding judge has resulted in an estimated
5% increase in available judicial resources (which is roughly equivalent to
3 judges in Sacramento County). If the 15 municipal court judges in
Sacramento were paid the same as superior court judges, the total annual
increase in judicial salaries would be approximately $129,000, compared
to the $300,000 in increased salaries which would result from adding 3
judges to the Sacramento bench.
Sacramento's experience is similar to that in other counties that have
consolidated. In Yolo County, equalizing the four municipal court judges'
salaries will cost around $35,000; but with consolidation, the county
reports a $25,000 annual savings in the reduced use of assigned judges and
indicates that consolidation has eliminated the need for two additional
judgeships (which equals an annual cost avoided of around $200,000 in
salary alone). San Bernardino reports that from January 1, 1993 to May 31,
1993, the 27 judicial positions assigned to the court handled a weighted
caseload of 40.7 judicial positions and that civil cases were tried with
virtually no delay (although weighted caseload statistics are generally
subject to criticism, the absence of delay on San Bernardino's civil
calendar plainly indicates that consolidation has had a real impact).
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Moreover, eliminating the need for additional judgeships saves more
than simply the salary of the judicial positions. When the associated costs
are included, it is extremely expensive to add and maintain a new
judgeship. Building a new courtroom can cost up to $500,000 in the first
year with maintenance costs of $25,000 or more annually. Providing staff
for the judgeship, including court reporting, court security, and interpreter
services as necessary, further adds to the costs. A recent study by the Los
Angeles Superior Court which attempted to include all of the costs of
operating a courtroom (including the cost to the county of hiring additional
prosecutors and other staff) reports that the average cost per year of
operating one criminal courtroom is $1,878,750. Using this figure, if trial
court unification frees up as few as 3 full-time equivalent judges statewide
it will have offset the additional spending required to compensate
municipal and justice court judges at the higher superior court judge rate.
At this point it is not known for sure whether the experiences in the
counties which already have consolidated will be repeated in all counties
after unification. Predicting how many additional full-time equivalent
judgeships will be avoided by trial court unification is difficult. If
Sacramento's experience were to be repeated statewide, unification would
result in an additional 73 full-time equivalent judges being added to the
system with an associated annual cost avoidance in salary alone of around
$7,000,000. When the overall cost of operating an additional courtroom is
considered, the total cost avoided annually could range anywhere from
$70,000,000 to well over $100,000,000.
Counties which have consolidated also report expenditure reductions
in addition to cost avoidance. For example, the coordination of case
processing systems and creation of integrated case management systems,
such as criminal departments that manage the entire criminal caseload
without transfer to a different court or location, result in time savings for
all participants. The consolidation of administration and support staff and
services results in the identification of duplicative positions which may be
targeted for elimination or transfer to new or understaffed programs. The
consolidated provision of interpreter services, court reporting, including
audio and video recording, juror services, and indigent defense panels
provide further responsible savings to the courts. Yolo County reports that
in the period 1991/92 - 1993/94, it experienced an actual reduction of
expenditures of approximately 14% in its budget. Ventura County reported
actual budget savings in the four years it has been consolidated as follows:
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1989/90 - 11.0% ($1,419,550); 1990/91 - 12.7% ($1,804,600); 1991/92 -
5.0% ($778,600); and 1992/93 - 3.5% ($755,800).
In sum, the information presently available to the standing committees
is insufficient to allow precise calculation of the overall fiscal impact of
trial court unification. If the experience of counties that have most fully
consolidated is repeated statewide, unification will result in significant
statewide fiscal savings. In order to more precisely calculate the overall
fiscal impact, we recommend that the Judicial Council engage the
consulting services of a national expert such as the National Center for
State Courts.
g. Unification in Other Jurisdictions. California will not be the first
jurisdiction to follow the ABA's recommendation for a single-level trial
court. Unified trial courts exist in one form or another in the District of
Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and South
Dakota, among other states. (National Center for State Courts, State Court
Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1991; Victor E. Flango & David
Rottman, Defining the Dimensions of Court Unification 16 Justice System
Journal, no. 1 at 65 (1993)) Of these unified systems, it appears that only
Minnesota, which began consolidating its courts in 1982, has completely
followed the ABA's recommendation that states create a single trial court
with a single type of trial court judge. The more typical form of unification
has been to create a single trial court with two or more types of judges or
to consolidate administratively while retaining separate divisions within the
trial court.
The experience in Minnesota has been favorable. The first district to
consolidate in Minnesota reported "'dramatic improvements in trial
calendar currency."' (Carl Baar, Trial Court Unification in Practice, 76
Judicature No. 4, p. 168, 181 (Dec.-Jan. 1993). Ten years later, Judge
Charles A. Porter Jr. of the Minnesota District Court Fourth Judicial
District, a former opponent of unification, reported that 'It's working
great.... One of the reasons our system operates as efficiently as it does
... is because most of the judges have done most of the assignments,' be
they criminal, civil, probate or juvenile court cases." (Barbara Rabinovitz,
"Unification Applauded in Other States," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly,
p. 3 (March 23, 1992))
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The Supreme Court
Section 2. The Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice of
California and 6 associate justices. The Chief Justice may convene the
court at any time. Concurrence of 4 judges present at the argument
is necessary for a judgment.
An acting Chief Justice shall perform all functions of the Chief
Justice when the Chief Justice is absent or unable to act. The Chief
Justice or, if the Chief Justice fails to do so, the court shall select an
associate justice as acting Chief Justice.
Comment
a. No proposed change. Trial court unification will have no foreseeable
impact upon the number or type of cases reaching the Supreme Court.
Trial court unification therefore affords no reason to amend Section 2.
The Court of Appeal
Section 3. The Legislature shall divide the State into districts each
containing a court of appeal with one or more divisions. Each division
consists of a presiding justice and 2 or more associate justices. It has
the power of a court of appeal and shall conduct itself as a 3-judge
court. Concurrence of 2 judges present at the argument is necessary
for a judgment.
An acting presiding justice shall perform all functions of the
presiding justice when the presiding justice is absent or unable to act.
The presiding justice or, if the presiding justice fails to do so, the
Chief Justice shall select an associate justice of that division as acting
presiding justice.
Comment
a. No proposed change. As a result of changes to Section 11, infra, trial
court unification should have no impact upon the number or type of cases
reaching the courts of appeal.
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The District Court
Section 4. In each county there is a s*perioF district court of one or
more judges. The Legislature shall prescribe the number of judges and
pFeivide-for-4he-effikem-and empleyees-ee5peeeoiofacprovid -for--.h- of2 e r .-neaeh-sup r- eour-t of each
district court. I-he -goringody ofeaeh-affeeted eounty-eone*rsy
the-- T gislat ue-m. pre eht--one-r--mere-j udges-scr''e mere -han
ene-super4oP -,t
T e-ounty e~k-k-is-e-x--oWW i -ok-f-the--stl:o curt in--e
eount-y,
Comment
a. District Court Jurisdictional Boundaries and Multiple Court
Facilities. A trial court's territorial jurisdiction should generally depend
upon (1) the distribution of population centers; (2) geographic features; and
(3) political boundaries. At present, each superior court's territorial
jurisdiction follows county lines, and, by statute, counties are further
divided into municipal and justice court districts. Many county lines in
California properly reflect population distribution and geographic features.
But many other county lines poorly account for widely dispersed
populations and different geographies, and in these counties, different
jurisdictional lines for the trial court may be justified. Notwithstanding this
fact, it was agreed that the unified trial courts should follow county lines
for the following reasons: (1) Ever since 1879, county lines have been
used as the jurisdictional boundary for California's trial court of general
jurisdiction; (2) County lines are a familiar governmental unit for members
of the public who must deal with the courts and vote in elections; (3)
Superior court administrative structures are based upon county lines, and
any change in the territorial jurisdiction would require a fresh analysis of
the administrative needs of every trial court; (4) Public agencies that
frequently interact with trial courts (e.g., prosecutors, public defenders,
corrections, and law enforcement agencies) are organized on a county
basis; and (5) Continued county funding of some court operations makes
county lines the most natural division between district courts.
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In those districts where population distribution and geography require
the use of multiple court facilities, the district court should itself establish
the proper location for those additional facilities pursuant to standards
promulgated by the Judicial Council. However, all court facilities within
a county should be part of the district court.
In some areas, a district court encompassing more than a single county
may appear more cost effective. There was, however, little support
expressed for multi-county districts, in part for the reasons expressed above
for adoption of a county boundary. In addition, the desired administrative
flexibility can be achieved by multi-district coordination activities
(including cross-assignments of judges).
A proposal to divide Los Angeles County into more than one district
was also considered and rejected, in part, again, for the reasons identified
above for preferring a county boundary. In addition, the presiding judges
and court administrators from Los Angeles who served on the two standing
committees felt that the citizens of Los Angeles would be better served by
one court district than by multiple districts. Moreover, the fact that Los
Angeles County will be served by one district court does not mean judicial
services will be centralized; to the contrary, there was general recognition
of the need to maintain existing facilities and to decentralize the provision
of judicial services as necessary to serve the public and to achieve
maximum efficiencies.
b. Rejection of Divisions Within the District Court. A number of the
states which have unified their trial courts have retained, in one form or
another, two divisions of the unified trial court. These divisions correspond
roughly to the present allocation of jurisdiction to superior and municipal
courts.
It is expected that legislation implementing unification in California
will continue to recognize substantial differences in the procedures used
to resolve different types of cases. Initially, implementing legislation would
codify most of the existing differences. (See, e.g. Section 11, infra)
Some judges have proposed that the best way to unify the trial courts
without incidentally (and unintentionally) affecting the existing differences
between superior court and municipal/justice court procedures is to specify
in the Constitution that "The district courts shall have two divisions," and
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further to provide that, "On the effective date of this amendment all causes
within the original jurisdiction of the superior courts are within the original
jurisdiction of Division One of the district courts and all causes within the
jurisdiction of the municipal and justice courts are within the jurisdiction
of Division Two of the district courts." All judges would be judges of the
district court and would sit by assignment in Division One or Division
Two. This constitutional proposal would not lock in place forever the
existing jurisdictional and procedural distinctions between the superior and
municipal/justice courts (because the Legislature could subsequently
reallocate jurisdiction between divisions one and two), and would provide
a relatively smooth transition.
However, after thoughtful consideration and discussion, this proposal
received little support. First, the whole purpose of trial court unification is
to create one trial court, not to perpetuate an artificial division between
trial level courts. Although creating constitutional divisions within a
unified district court would not create the same degree of separation that
now exists between superior and municipal/justice courts (in particular,
there would be unified administrative control), requiring constitutionally
separate divisions within a supposedly unified court creates an awkward
and confused constitutional structure: The trial courts would be unified, but
only to a degree.
Second, the differentiation of procedures applicable to different types
of cases is more directly and appropriately addressed as an issue of case
management rather than of court jurisdiction. Certainly, effective case
management requires that different types of cases be subject to different
trial court procedures. But a variety of trial court procedural requirements
can be maintained without creating separate jurisdictional divisions of the
trial court.
Third, the creation of divisions or departments within the district court
is a matter more properly dealt with by the judiciary itself through state-
wide or local rules of court or by the Legislature through statutes. (see,
e C.C.P. §§ 116.110-116.950 (Small Claims Court); C.C.P. §§ 1730-
1772 (Family Conciliation Court); Wel. & Inst. Code § 200 et seq.
(Juvenile Court)). There appears to be no principled reason for creating
Divisions One and Two by constitutional provision, but creating Small
Claims Court, Family Conciliation Court and Juvenile Court by statutory
provisions.
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Fourth, public policy and sound judicial administration demand that all
judges at all levels of the judiciary be responsible for insuring that the
justice system serves the needs of the public. Every judge should have a
stake in the system and feel a responsibility for its operation. Yet a judicial
system that divides itself into separate jurisdictional compartments is likely
to divide itself into more narrowly focused interest groups. It is clear, for
example, that many of the interests of the municipal court (where the
greatest number of ordinary cases for the average Californian are handled)
do not correspond exactly to the interests of the superior court. Unification
of the superior, municipal and justice courts into a single trial level court
will make all district court judges equally responsible for making the
system work and reduce the potential conflicts between those three
separate courts.
Some have expressed serious concerns that unification will necessarily
lead to an increased and improper reliance upon commissioners to handle
cases that formerly were within the jurisdiction of the municipal court,
thereby creating an "underground" or second-tier judiciary notwithstanding
unification. If this happens, it will not be because unification has created
that opportunity. Indeed, over the last decade, courts around the State have
increasingly relied upon commissioners and other non-judges to preside
over trials. Small claims disputes are routinely handled by non-judges and
parking violations are now processed administratively. Some have
proposed that traffic infractions should also be processed administratively.
There are legitimate questions about whether this shifting of judicial
business away from judges robs the public of its constitutionally
guaranteed right of access to courts for resolution of disputes.
Unification presents an opportunity to bring this topic to the surface.
As just noted, in a unified trial court, all trial court judges will be
responsible for insuring that their court serves the needs of the public.
Each unified district court should study its use of commissioners and other
non-judges to perform judicial work. Ultimately, whether the public's
interests will continue to be served by a unified trial court will depend
very largely upon the exercise of sound judgment by the judges of each
court.
c. Court Employees. In a state-wide system of courts, good
management principles require that courts have authority to provide for
their own employees within the limits of resources provided to the courts.
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It is for this reason that the proposed amendments delete language
specifically authorizing the Legislature to provide for court employees and
language providing that the county clerk is the clerk ex officio of the
superior court. With respect to the provision for officers and employees of
the superior court, the current language blurs the separation between the
judicial branch and legislative branch. Subject to budget constraints and
legislative oversight, courts should have the power to decide what positions
are necessary and to select their own employees. With respect to the
county clerk, the existing provision blurs the separation between the
judicial branch and executive branch. The district court should have power
to select its own chief executive officer.
d. Multi-District Judges. Section 4 presently provides that the
governing body of a county may agree to permit one or more judges to
serve more than one superior court. This authority is not presently utilized
and is unnecessary in light of the Chief Justice's more flexible authority
to make judicial assignments as needed to address changing workloads.
The-Munieipt1 and Justice C----s
Seetie"--.--(a)--ecnty-.ha!Ie be d. A ••atO4
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statte
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Comment
a. Municipal and justice courts will be merged into the district court,
and Section 5 should thus be repealed.
The Judicial Council
Section 6. The Judicial Council consists of the Chief Justice, who
shall be the presiding officer, and one other judge of the Supreme
Court, 3 judges of courts of appeal, --judges-oef. superr eeuF*s--3
judgesuof-munieipake! cor-tsand-2-udges-j etc eom4S 10 judges of
district courts, 2 non-voting court administrators, and such other non-
voting members as determined by the Council, each appointed by the
Chief Justice for a 2 3-year term pursuant to procedures established by
the Council; 4 members of the State Bar appointed by its governing
body for 2 3-year terms; and one member of each house of the
Legislature appointed as provided by the house.
Council membership terminates if a member ceases to hold the
position that qualified the member for appointment. A vacancy shall
be filled by the appointing power for the remainder of the term.
The council may appoint an Administrative Director of the Courts,
who serves at its pleasure and performs functions delegated by the
council or the Chief Justice, other than adopting rules of court
administration, practice and procedure.
The Judicial Council is the policy-making body for the courts. To
improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial
business and make recommendations to the courts, make
recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt
rules for court administration, adopt rules for practice and procedure
not inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions prescribed
by statute.
The Chief Justice shall be the chief executive officer for the courts
and shall implement the rules promulgated by the Judicial Council. The
Chief Justice shall seek to expedite judicial business and to equalize
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the work of judges. The Chief Justice may provide for the assignment
of any judge to another court but only with the judge's consent if the
court is of lower jurisdiction. A retired judge who consents may be
assigned to any court.
Judges shall report to the Judicial Council as the Chief Justice
directs concerning the condition of judicial business in their courts.
They shall cooperate with the council and hold court as assigned.
Comment
a. Composition of Council. Superior, municipal and justice courts make
up 10 seats on the Judicial Council presently. After trial court unification,
those seats will be filled by district court judges.
The Judicial Council is the policy-making body for the Judicial Branch.
The separation of powers principle, as well as the principle that judges
should be in control of administrative and policy matters concerning the
governance of the judiciary raise concerns about inclusion on the Judicial
Council of non-judges. For example, the ABA's Standards for Judicial
Administration expressly provide that administrative rules should be
promulgated by a body that includes only judges, noting that non-judges
may, at times, have interests that conflict with those of the court system.
ABA Standards for Judicial Administrative, § 1.32, commentary.
Ultimately, however, it was decided the real, practical benefits of
inclusion outweighed the more speculative, theoretical risks of inclusion.
The representatives from the State Bar and the Legislature bring an
important perspective to Council deliberations that otherwise might be
absent. Most Council deliberations do not involve the promulgation of
administrative rules, and separation of powers concerns are therefore
somewhat diminished. Moreover, no one on the Council can recall an issue
where the votes cast by non-judges have been outcome determinative.
The proposed amendment incorporates the long-standing practice of
inviting two court administrators to sit with the Council in a non-voting
capacity and authorizes the Council to invite other persons to sit with the
Council in a non-voting capacity.
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b. Three-Year Terms. Although the Constitution provides for 2-year
terms for most members of the Judicial Council, the actual practice for
many years was to make 4-year appointments (2 consecutive 2-year terms).
The present practice is to make 3-year appointments. The Constitution
should be changed to reflect this practice.
c. Administrative Rules. As presently drafted, Section 6 provides the
Judicial Council with power to "adopt rules for court administration,
practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute." As a result of this
language, rules for court administration are made subject to legislative
control. The proposed amendment, which inserts the phrase "adopt rules
for" prior to the words "practice and procedure" and deletes the comma
between "practice and procedure" and "not inconsistent with statute," is
intended to have the effect of giving the Judicial Council the power to
adopt rules of court administration that are not subject to legislative
override. Only rules of "practice and procedure" would be subject to the
requirement that they be "not inconsistent with statute."
Courts possess the inherent power as a co-equal branch of government
to make rules governing their own internal operations. ABA Standards
Relating to Court Organization, §§ 1.31-1.32. This inherent power should
be reflected in the Constitution. Making internal rules of administration
subject to legislative control interferes with the achievement of operational
efficiencies and undermines judicial accountability.
Administrative rules relate to subjects such as court calendars,
assignment of judges, responsibilities of court personnel, internal
administrative procedures, and financing administration. As a general
matter, administrative rules are addressed primarily to judges and other
court officials and are designed to govern how categories of cases shall be
processed. ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization, § 1.11(c),
commentary, p. 13. Rules of practice and procedure, by contrast, are
addressed primarily to the litigants and are designed to govern how
individual cases shall be presented to the court.
d. The Role of the Council and the Chief Justice. One of the core
principles of court organization is that someone or somebody "clearly
stand out as the official to be held if the judicial organization is not
functioning the most efficiently that the law and the nature of its tasks
permit." Pound, Organization of Courts, p. 275-76. In California, the
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Judicial Council is the body which stands out as the policy-maker for
California's courts, and the Chief Justice, as the presiding officer of the
Judicial Council, stands out as the person responsible for executing the
policies declared by the Council. The 1926 ballot argument in support of
the constitutional provision creating the Judicial Council provided that "the
Chief Justice will fill the position that a general superintendent fills in an
ordinary business. He [sic] will be the real, as well as the nominal, head
of the judiciary of the State." The proposed amendments here are intended
to reflect and emphasize the Chief Justice's existing responsibilities.
Commission on Judicial Appointments
Section 7. The Commission on Judicial Appointments consists of
the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, and the presiding justice of
the court of appeal of the affected district or, if there are 2 or more
presiding justices, the one who has presided longest or, when a
nomination or appointment to the Supreme Court is to be considered,
the presiding justice who has presided longest on any court of appeal.
Comment
a. No proposed change. Trial court unification has no impact upon
appointments at the Supreme Court or court of appeal level, and there is
therefore no reason to amend this section.
Commission on Judicial Performance
Section 8. (a) The Commission on Judicial Performance consists of
2 judges of courts of appeal, 2 3 judges of speor-eeurt*-,--n - ee
judgee f-a-ii!iceu"4 district courts, each appointed by the
Supreme Court; 2 members of the State Bar of California who have
practiced law in this State for 10 years, appointed by its governing
body; and 2 citizens who are not judges, retired judges, or members
of the State Bar of California, appointed by the Governor and
approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring.
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,eji a ...... . - isio(-, All terms are 4 years. No
member shall serve more than 2 4-year terms.
Commission membership terminates if a member ceases to hold the
position that qualified the member for appointment. A vacancy shall
be filled by the appointing power for the remainder of the term. A
member whose term has expired may continue to serve until the
vacancy has been filled by the appointing power.
.T a ed-ete fe-erg-h mn -mem ber--of-4he
C-O(Missiofl-efldiia-P -manee, the folwn cbisshall-be
appoiinedas4llews*'
() The ..... of appea-member- . .e teeimmediately-".. .eed
t he_ term XTO-~ir=-e-ed- -8, lrshaHl-se~vt-a-2-year-ter-.
(2 O te tae-Bamer-ainted t eiatel ;- sueeed
a-2-yea--ter n
Comment
a. Number of District Court Judges on Commission. Presently, this
section provides for 2 superior court judges and 1 municipal court judge
to serve on the Commission. As a result of unification, the section should
be amended to provide for 3 district court judges on the Commission.
b. Deletion of Subsection (b). Subsection (b) was a transition provision
added as a result of Proposition 92 to insure staggered terms. The
provision serves no present function in the Constitution and should be
deleted as surplusage at the earliest possible opportunity.
The State Bar of California
Section 9. The State Bar of California is a public corporation.
Every person admitted and licensed to practice law in this State is and
shall be a member of the State Bar except while holding office as a
judge of a court of record.
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Comments
a. No proposed change.
Original Jurisdiction
Section 10. The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, super4oi district
courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus
proceedings. Thse-c -ts The Supreme Court and courts of appeal also
have original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the
nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The district courts
and their judges have original jurisdiction in proceedings for
extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari and
prohibition, except review of court proceedings in Category One causes.
SupeRoF District courts have original jurisdiction in all other causes
eeept thosegii e-b ..tatutea-etheF Fi.:-t ee-ts. All causes shall be
assigned to Category One or Category Two as provided in Section 11.
The court may make such comment on the evidence and the
testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary
for the proper determination of the cause.
Comments
a. The district court will be California's trial court of general
jurisdiction. Trial court unification does not require any substantive
changes to the Constitution in jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings.
With respect to proceedings for extraordinary relief, the Supreme Court
and courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to issue writs to review
Category One cases, and the district court itself shall have jurisdiction to
issue writs to review Category Two cases. As explained in the comments
to Section 11, infra, Category One cases will initially correspond to cases
within the jurisdiction of the superior courts, and Category Two cases will
initially correspond to cases within the jurisdiction of the municipal and
justice courts. It may be appropriate to lodge the district court's
jurisdiction to issue writs in Category Two cases in its appellate
department (see comment to § 11 below).
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Appellate Jurisdiction
Section 11. (a) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when
judgment of death has been pronounced. With that exception courts
of appeal and district courts have appellate jurisdiction when-sui~iei-eoavtsJ=- m ej jir''n-i-rsdi~ion-and-i oh- ---w- b-b
statut as provided in this section.
(b) All causes in the district courts are within Category One or
Category Two. Assignment of classes of causes to either of these
categories shall be made pursuant to rules adopted by the Judicial
Council which shall become effective when approved by a majority of the
Supreme Court. Any cause not assigned to Category Two shall be
deemed to be assigned to Category One.
(c) Courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction in Category One
causes, cases in which one or more causes within Category One is joined
in the same proceeding with one or more causes within Category Two,
and in other causes prescribed by statute.
(d) SupeFioe District courts have appellate jurisdiction in Category
Two causes preser4bed-by-statute that arise i--municipal and justice
eouwts within their eeunties territorial jurisdictions.
(e) The Legislature may permit appellate courts to take evidence
and make findings of fact when jury trial is waived or not a matter of
right.
Comment
a. Historical Development of Appellate Jurisdiction in California.
States are not required by the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of
the United States Constitution to provide litigants with a right of appeal.
(McKane v. Durston (1894) 153 U.S. 684, 687; Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469
U.S. 387, 393 (citing McKane).) Nor, apart from this section, does the
California Constitution guarantee litigants a right of appeal.
279
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
Historically, the drafters of California's Constitution endeavored
specifically to list categories of cases in which appeals would be permitted.
For example, the California Constitution of 1849 provided the Supreme
Court with appellate jurisdiction "in all cases when the matter in dispute
exceeds two hundred dollars, when the legality of any tax, toll, or impost
or municipal fine is in question, and in all criminal cases amounting to
felony on questions of law alone.... ." (Art. VI, § 4) Appellate jurisdiction
was expanded by amendments in 1862 to include "all cases in equity" and
matters involving real property, or in which the amount in controversy
exceeded three hundred dollars. The list of cases falling within the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was further expanded in the
Constitution of 1879 to encompass the following:
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in
equity, except such as arise in Justices' Courts; also, in all cases at
law which involve the title or possession of real estate, or the
legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, or
in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars; also, in
cases of forcible entry and detainer, and in proceedings in
insolvency, and in actions to prevent or abate a nuisance, and in all
such probate matters as may be provided by law; also, in all
criminal cases prosecuted by indictment, or information in a Court
of Record on questions of law alone. The Court shall also have
power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and
habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the
complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. (Constitution of
1879, art. VI, § 4)
The Supreme Court interpreted Section 4 as a self-executing conferral
of appellate power. As such, "[t]he Legislature ... can pass no act
impairing the exercise of this appellate power." (Haight v. Gay (1857) 8
Cal. 297, 300.)
The long list of actions in Section 4 over which appellate jurisdiction
could be asserted created some anomalies. Although the list of actions in
Section 4 might appear to be inclusive, it did not cover all final trial court
judgments. It did not, for example, cover a judgment of contempt, and
since no statute provided for appeals from a judgment of contempt (indeed,
C.C.P. § 1222 provided that "[t]he judgment and orders of the court or
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judge made in cases of contempt are final and conclusive"), there was no
right to appeal a judgment of contempt. (Tyler v. Connolly (1884) 65 Cal.
28, 30).
The 1904 amendments, which created the district courts of appeal, did
nothing to simplify matters. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was
narrowed by limiting its appellate criminal jurisdiction to capital cases,
raising the amount in controversy in legal actions to $2,000, and removing
from its appellate jurisdiction forcible entry and detainer, insolvency and
nuisance cases. As a result of those amendments, Section 4 provided as
follows:
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction on appeal from
the superior courts in all cases in equity, except such as arise in
Justices' Courts; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or
possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, toll, or municipal fine, or in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy,
amounts to two thousand dollars; also, on questions of law alone,
in all criminal cases where judgment of death has been rendered.
The Court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all other writs
necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. (Constitution of 1879, as amended 1904, art. VI, § 4)
The court of appeal's appellate jurisdiction was equally detailed:
The District Courts of Appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction on
appeal from the Superior Courts in all cases at law in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars, and does not amount
to two thousand dollars; also, in all cases of forcible and unlawful
entry and detainer (except such as arise in Justices' Courts), in
proceedings in insolvency, and in actions to prevent or abate a
nuisance; in proceedings of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition,
usurpation of office, contesting elections and eminent domain, and
in such other special proceedings as may be provided by law
(excepting cases in which appellate jurisdiction is given to the
Supreme Court); also, on question of law alone, in all criminal
cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record,
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excepting criminal cases where judgment of death has been
rendered. The said courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction in
all cases, matters, and proceedings pending before the Supreme
Court which shall be ordered by the Supreme Court to be
transferred to a District Court of Appeal for hearing and decision.
(Constitution of 1879, art. VI, § 4, as amended in 1904.)
These detailed lists, although again probably meant to be inclusive,
created a risk of legislative tampering with appellate jurisdiction. In In re
Sutter-Butte By-Pass Assessment (1923) 190 Cal. 532, the Supreme Court
was forced to confront such an effort. The Legislature authorized certain
drainage bonds to be retired by assessments on the property benefited, and
provided for a three-judge superior court trial to validate a proposed
assessment. The statute expressly precluded an appeal from the superior
court's validation judgment. The Supreme Court accepted an appeal from
a validation judgment notwithstanding the statutory limitation, reasoning
that the case fell within its express appellate jurisdiction over cases
"involving the validity of any tax or assessment," jurisdiction which the
Legislature could not impair. (190 Cal. at 539).
b. Appellate Jurisdiction under the 1966 Revision. The 1966
constitutional revision of these provisions reflected the modern view that
a constitution, as a statement of "organic law," should not be cluttered
with unnecessary detail. As a result of that revision, Section 11 now
provides in relevant part as follows:
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when judgment of
death has been pronounced. With that exception courts of appeal
have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original
jurisdiction and in other causes prescribed by statute.
Superior Courts have appellate jurisdiction in causes prescribed by
statute that arise in municipal and justice courts in their counties.
The simplicity in drafting achieved by the 1966 revision reflects a
simplicity of thought and principle: every litigant should have one
opportunity for an appeal. Thus, appeals from cases arising in the
municipal and justice courts (misdemeanors, traffic offenses, civil cases
under $25,000, and small claims) are heard by the Superior Court, as
provided by statute. Cases which arise originally in the superior court are
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heard by the Court of Appeal, except for capital cases which are
appealable directly to the Supreme Court because of their importance.
c. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court. Appeals from
municipal and justice courts, are currently heard by the superior court. The
Superior Court now processes more appeals than does the Court of Appeal.
In 1991-92, the Superior Courts disposed of 23,595 appeals, while the
Court of Appeal disposed of 22,415 appeals. 1993 Annual Report pp. 27
& 59.
Municipal and justice courts have original trial jurisdiction in criminal
misdemeanor and infraction cases, in civil cases with a value of $25,000
or less, and in small claims cases not exceeding $5,000. (C.C.P. §§ 86,
86.1, 116.110-116.950) Criminal misdemeanor and infraction cases, and
civil cases with a value of $25,000 or less are appealed to the appellate
department of the Superior Court. (C.C.P. § 904.2) Appeals in small claims
cases are heard by the superior court holding a trial de novo. (C.C.P. §
116.770(a))
Although the total number of appeals taken to the Superior Court may
seem substantial (28,061 new filings in 1991-92), when the numbers are
compared to the total volume of cases processed by the municipal and
justice courts, a different picture is painted. In 1991-92, only 3.7% of civil
dispositions were appealed (23,626 cases), and only 0.032% of criminal
dispositions were appealed (4,435 cases). 1993 Annual Report p. 59.
d. Trial Court Unification and the Appellate Department. Unification
of superior, municipal and justice courts into one district court creates a
problem when it comes to handling appeals in those cases that formerly
were within the jurisdiction of the municipal and justice courts. If all of
those cases, which formerly were appealed to the superior court, were
made appealable to the court of appeal, the court of appeal's docket would
double in size, significant judicial resources would have to be added to the
court of appeal to handle the new cases, and parties to the appeal would
experience additional costs and delays. To forestall this transfer of
workload and increase in appellate cost and delay from occurring, the
proposed amendments contemplate the retention of an appellate department
of the district court to which those cases would be appealed (with
subsequent review by the court of appeal pursuant to certification or
transfer order, which is the current practice).
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However, appellate jurisdiction is not simply a matter of caseloads and
case management. The guiding principle for over a century in California
has been that appeals are heard by judges independent from those who
heard the original cause. Moreover, more is at stake here than abstract
principle. Public confidence in the judiciary requires such independence on
the part of reviewing courts.
Principle and public confidence can be preserved through adoption by
the Judicial Council of rules that guarantee the independence of the
appellate department and the quality and independence of judges serving
in the appellate department. These rules should set forth relevant factors
to be used by the Chief Justice in making appointments to the appellate
department. The factors would include criteria such as length of service as
a district judge, reputation within the district, and degree of separateness
of the appellate department's workload from the judge's regular
assignments (e.g., a district court judge who routinely handles large
numbers of misdemeanors should ordinarily not serve in the appellate
department). In addition, appointments to the appellate department should
be for a minimum term of two or three years.
e. Category One and Category Two Causes. At present, decisions by
the superior court are ordinarily appealable to the court of appeal, and
decisions by the municipal and justice courts are ordinarily appealable to
the appellate department of the superior court. By statutorily defining the
jurisdiction of the trial courts, the Legislature incidentally affects whether
appeals are heard by the court of appeal or the appellate department. As
a practical matter, however, the Legislature exercises little control over
appellate jurisdiction since the reassignment of a class of cases from the
original jurisdiction of the superior court to the original jurisdiction of the
municipal and justice courts has such significant implications entirely apart
from which court has appellate jurisdiction.
After unification, it will no longer be possible to use the assignment of
causes to a particular trial court as the basis for determining which
appellate court has jurisdiction. Whether appeals should be heard by the
court of appeal or the appellate department is largely a matter of judicial
policy and administration, and for that reason, the proposed amendment
authorizes the Judicial Council, with the approval of a majority of the
justices of the Supreme Court, to classify cases within Category One or
Category Two.
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There is ample precedent for giving the Judicial Council and Supreme
Court rule-making power over appellate jurisdiction. For example, in New
York, which has an "appellate term" similar to California's appellate
department, the "appellate division of the supreme court" (which is the
counterpart of California's court of appeal) has rule-making power to
direct appeals otherwise within its jurisdiction to be heard and decided by
the appellate term. N.Y. Const., Art. VI, § 8(d). Under 28 U.S.C. §
2072(c), the United States Supreme Court is given power to determine by
rule what district court decisions are "final for the purposes of appeal."
The Illinois Supreme Court has power to "provide by rule for direct
appeal" in cases other than capital cases (which, as in California, are
appealed directly to the state supreme court as a matter of right). Ill.
Const., Art. VI, § 4(b). The Illinois court may also "provide by rule for
appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit
Courts." Ill. Const., Art. VI, § 6.
The classification of causes will affect not only which court has
appellate jurisdiction, but also which court has jurisdiction to issue
extraordinary writs (see Section 10, supra), and whether the Legislature
may provide for an 8-person jury in civil cases (see Art. I, § 16, supra).
It is anticipated the initial rules of appellate jurisdiction will classify all
causes within the jurisdiction of the municipal and justice courts as
Category Two causes, thereby preserving the status quo. In addition, it is
anticipated that implementing legislation will preserve other differences in
the way Category One and Category Two cases are now processed in the
superior and municipal/justice courts (e.g., the limited discovery and
motion provisions of the Economic Litigation Program, C.C.P. § 90, would
continue to apply to Category Two cases).
Appellate Transfer Power
Section 12. (a) The Supreme Court may, before decision, transfer
to itself a cause in a court of appeal. It may, before decision, transfer
a cause from itself to a court of appeal or from one court of appeal or
division to another. The court to which a cause is transferred has
jurisdiction.
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(b) The Supreme Court may review the decision of a court of
appeal in any cause.
(c) The Judicial Council shall provide, by rules of court, for the
time and procedure for transfer and for review, including, among
other things, provisions for the time and procedure for transfer with
instructions, for review of all or part of a decision, and for remand as
improvidently granted.
(d) This section shall not apply to an appeal involving a judgment
of death.
Comment
a. No substantive change necessary.
Harmless Error
Section 13. No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the
improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to
any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Comment
a. No proposed change.
Appellate Opinions
Section 14. The Legislature shall provide for the prompt
publication of such opinions of the Supreme Court and courts of
appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those opinions
shall be available for publication by any person.
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Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.
Comment
a. No proposed change.
Qualifications for Judges
Section 15. A person is ineligible to be a judge of a court of record
unless for 5 ycars immcdiatclly-reeeding seeetien-e-a-mtmieipfor
justiee--eour-t-ei 10 years immediately preceding selection to--ethe
eoeuts, the person has been a member of the State Bar or served as a
judge of a court of record in this State. A-judge -l'gi le-fe-m nie4pal
eebee a-bsigned-b4 he-Ghief-4&fiee-t-seve-a ny
eeaut-
Comment
a. The 10-Year Requirement. Because all district court judges will have
jurisdiction to hear all types of cases, it was agreed that upon unification,
the 5-year rule which applied to municipal and justice courts should be
abandoned in favor of a uniform 10-year rule for all judicial appointments.
b. Residence. No residency requirement currently exists for superior
court judges. In People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467, 500, the
Supreme Court held that the constitutional qualifications for judges are
exclusive, and legislative attempts to add qualifications are
unconstitutional. The proposed amendments contain no residence
requirement for judges of the district court. The only qualifications are
those contained in this section.
Exemption from Service Requirement for Sitting Judges
Section 15.5. The-9-yea- membr-shi4p-wr scviec requirement ef
Setion d ot-appjyo-ustke-uiudges wh off e-on
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January-1-9-988. The 10-year service requirement of Section 15 does not
apply to municipal and justice court judges who held office on July 1,
1995.
This section shall be operative only until July 1, -995 2000, and as
of that date is repealed.
Comment
a. Some recently appointed judges on the municipal and justice courts
may not presently satisfy the 10-year rule, and it was agreed that these
judges should be exempted from the new requirement. Section 15.5 is
repealed by its own terms after five years.
Judicial Elections
Section 16. (a) Judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected at
large and judges of courts of appeal shall be elected in their districts
at general elections at the same time and places as the Governor.
Their terms are 12 years beginning the Monday after January 1
following their election, except that a judge elected to an unexpired
term serves the remainder of the term. In creating a new court of
appeal district or division the Legislature shall provide that the first
elective terms are 4, 8, and 12 years.
(b) Judges of ether district courts shall be elected in their eounties
eo districts at general elections. The Legislature may provide that an
unopposed incumbent's name not appear on the ballot.
(c) Terms of judges of supe4ar district courts are 6 years beginning
the Monday after January 1 following their election. A vacancy shall
be filled by election to a full term at the next general election after the
third January 1 following the vacancy, but the Governor shall appoint
a person to fill the vacancy timporarily until the elected judge's term
begins..
(d) Within 30 days before August 16 preceding the expiration of
the judge's term, a judge of the Supreme Court or a court of appeal
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may file a declaration of candidacy to succeed to the office presently
held by the judge. If the declaration is not filed, the Governor before
September 16 shall nominate a candidate. At the next general election,
only the candidate so declared or nominated may appear on the ballot,
which shall present the question whether the. candidate shall be
elected. The candidate shall be elected upon receiving a majority of the
votes on the question. A candidate not elected may not be appointed
to that court but later may be nominated and elected.
The Governor shall fill vacancies in those courts by appointment.
An appointee holds office until the Monday after January 1 following
the first general election at which the appointee had the right to
become a candidate or until an elected judge qualifies. A nomination
or appointment by the Governor is effective when confirmed by the
Commission on Judicial Appointments.
Electors of a eaunty district court, by majority of those voting and
in a manner the Legislature shall provide, may make this system of
selection applicable to judges of supeFri district courts.
Comment
a. County-Wide Electoral Districts. Ever since 1879, judges elected to
California's trial court of general jurisdiction have run in county-wide
elections. The proposed amendments to this section continue that long-
standing historical practice.
Proposals to create electoral sub-districts within the district court's
overall territorial jurisdiction (which, pursuant to Section 4, supra is
county-wide) present severe problems. First, electoral sub-districts may
foster a public expectation that judges "represent" the sub-district and that
such judges would be expected to side with sub-district interests in
litigation. That expectation is inconsistent with the Rule of Law and the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which require judicial independence and
impartiality. Second, one of the primary advantages of unification is
increased flexibility in judicial assignments. The creation of sub-districts
would likely create an expectation that a judge elected from a sub-district
would serve primarily within that district, impairing flexibility in judicial
assignments.
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b. Voting Rights Act Compliance. Trial court unification presents
complex issues under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. (42 U.S.C. § 1973,
et sec.) The Act contains two major provisions regarding discrimination in
voting practices. Section 2 of the Act prohibits any election procedures that
"resul[t] in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color. . . ." (42 U.S.C. §
1973(a)) Section 5 of the Act requires covered jurisdictions to submit any
changes in voting procedures to preclearance (either judicial or
administrative). (42 U.S.C. § 1973c) Both of these sections apply to
judicial elections. (Chisom v. Roemer (1991) 111 S. Ct. 2354 (Section 2
case); Clark v. Roemer (1991) 111 S. Ct. 2096 (Section 5 case))
Presently, superior court electoral and jurisdictional lines follow county
lines. Municipal and justice court electoral and jurisdictional lines are
drawn more narrowly to reflect the geographic areas and populations they
serve. After unification, district court jurisdictional and electoral lines will
follow county lines. Judicial independence and integrity are best served by
a district-wide electoral scheme under which judges are elected by all
qualified electors in the district. Depending on past voting patterns and
other circumstances, and future interpretations of the applicability of the
Voting Rights Act to judicial elections, however, district-wide elections
may present issues under the Voting Rights Act in some communities. For
example, if municipal court judges who presently sit in a predominately
minority district are required to run in county-wide elections after
unification, a claim of vote dilution may be presented. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Lodge (1982) 458 U.S. 613 (at-large system). Moreover, four counties in
California, Monterey, King, Merced and Yuba, are subject to Section 5's
pre-clearance requirements. On the other hand, a race-conscious effort to
draw electoral lines may itself run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shaw v. Reno (1993) 113 S. Ct. 2816.
In these circumstances, the most appropriate action is to enact an
electoral scheme that makes the most sense in terms of constitutional
structure and the relationship of an independent judiciary to electors. The
most natural boundaries for district courts - based upon history and the
public's common understanding - are the existing boundaries between
counties.
c. Filling Vacancies. As presently drafted, Section 16(c) authorizes the
Governor temporarily to fill a vacant superior court seat by appointment,
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and that appointee is then subject to the next general election after January
1 following the vacancy. In some cases, this means a judge is subject to
election only a few months after the appointment, which usually is too
short a time in which to become known to the bar and the public. The fact
that an appointed judge would have to stand for election so quickly has
been an impediment to attracting the best qualified candidates to serve as
trial court judges.
As a result of the changes to subsection (c), an appointed judge would
be given one-half of a term (3 years) before having to run for election.
This should give an appointed judge enough time to establish his or her
own reputation on the bench, and the 3-year appointive period will make
service on the bench a more attractive possibility to members of the bar.
Other Judicial Activities
Section 17. A judge of a court of record may not practice law and
during the term for which the judge was selected is ineligible for
public employment or public office other than judicial employment or
judicial office, except a judge of a court of record may accept a part-
time teaching position that is outside the normal hours of his or her
judicial position and that does not interfere with the regular
performance of his or her judicial duties while holding office. A judge
of a tria-eourt-of-Ieer-d district court may, however, become eligible
for election to other public office by taking a leave of absence without
pay prior to filing a declaration of candidacy. Acceptance of the public
office is a resignation from the office of judge.
A judicial officer may not receive fines or fees for personal use.
A judicial officer may not earn retirement service credit from a
public teaching position while holding judicial office.
Comment
a. No substantive change required. The phrase "trial court of record"
referred to superior, municipal and justice courts, which were the only trial
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courts of record. After unification, the "trial court of record" is the district
court. See Section 1, supra.
Judicial Disqualification and Removal
Section 18. (a) A judge is disqualified from acting as a judge,
without loss of salary, while there is pending (1) an indictment or an
information charging the judge in the United States with a crime
punishable as a felony under California or federal law, or (2) a
recommendation to the Supreme Court by the Commission on Judicial
Performance for removal or retirement of the judge.
(b) On recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
Performance or on its own motion, the Supreme Court may suspend
a judge from office without salary when in the United States the judge
pleads guilty or no contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as
a felony under California or federal law or of any other crime that
involves moral turpitude under that law. If the conviction is reversed
suspension terminates, and the judge shall be paid the salary for the
judicial office held by the judge for the period of suspension. If the
judge is suspended and the conviction becomes final the Supreme
Court shall remove the judge from office.
(c) On recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
Performance the Supreme Court may (1) retire a judge for disability
that seriously interferes with the performance of the judge's duties and
is or is likely to become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge
for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement
of the judge's current term that constitutes wilful misconduct in office,
persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual
intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute. The Commission on Judicial Performance may privately
admonish a judge found to have engaged in an improper action or
dereliction of duty, subject to review in the Supreme Court in the
manner provided for review of causes decided by a court of appeal.
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(d) A judge retired by the Supreme Court shall be considered to
have retired voluntarily. A judge removed by the Supreme Court is
ineligible for judicial office and pending further order of the court is
suspended from practicing law in this State.
(e) A recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance
for the censure, removal or retirement of a judge of the Supreme
Court shall be determined by a tribunal of 7 court of appeal judges
selected by lot.
(f) If, after conducting a preliminary investigation, the Commission
on Judicial Performance by vote determines that formal proceedings
should be instituted:
(1) The judge or judges charged may require that formal hearings
be public, unless the Commission on Judicial Performance by vote
finds good cause for confidential hearings.
(2) The Commission on Judicial Performance may, without further
review in the Supreme Court, issue a public reproval with the consent
of the judge for conduct warranting discipline. The public reproval
shall include an enumeration of any and all formal charges brought
against the judge which have not been dismissed by the commission.
(3) The Commission on Judicial Performance may in the pursuit
of public confidence and the interests of justice, issue press statements
or releases or, in the event charges involve moral turpitude,
dishonesty, or corruption, open hearings to the public.
(g) The Commission on Judicial Performance may issue
explanatory statements at any investigatory stage when the subject
matter is generally known to the public.
(h) The Judicial Council shall make rules implementing this section
and providing for confidentiality of proceedings.
Comment
a. No proposed change.
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Compensation
Section 19. The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges
of courts of record.
A judge of a court of record may not receive the salary for the
judicial office held by the judge while any cause before the judge
remains pending and undetermined for 90 days after it has been
submitted for decision.
Comment
a. No proposed change.
Retirement
Section 20. The Legislature shall provide for retirement, with
reasonable allowance, of judges of courts of record for age or
disability.
Comment
a. No proposed change.
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Temporary Judges
Section 21. On stipulation of the parties litigant the court may
order a cause to be tried by a temporary judge who is a member of
the State Bar, sworn and empowered to act until final determination
of the cause.
Comment
a. No proposed change.
Commissioners
Section 22. The Legislature may provide for the appointment by
tri4at er4s feeer d district courts of officers such as commissioners
to perform subordinate judicial duties.
Comment
,a. No substantive change. Upon unification, district courts will be the




(a) The venue of any of the 'following actions or proceedings
brought in a sttper-io district court shall be Sacramento County:
(1) An action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or
annul any provision of the statute enacted by Senate Bill No. 200 of
the 1979-80 Regular Session of the Legislature.
(2) An action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or
annul the determination made by the Director of Water Resources and
the Director of Fish and Game pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section
11255 of the Water Code.
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(3) An action or proceeding which would have the effect of
attacking, reviewing, preventing, or substantially delaying the
construction, operation, or maintenance of the peripheral canal unit
described in subdivision (a) of Section 11255 of the Water Code.
(4) An action or proceeding to re4uire the State Water Resources
Development System to comply with subdivision (b) of Section 11460
of the Water Code.
(5) An action or proceeding to require the Department of Water
Resources or its successor agency to comply with the permanent
agreement specified in subdivision (a) of Section 11256 of the Water
Code.
(6) An action or proceeding to require the Department of Water
Resources or its successor agency to comply with the provisions of the
contracts entered into pursuant to Section 11456 of the Water Code.
(b) An action or proceeding described in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) shall be commenced within one year after the effective
date of the statute enacted by Senate Bill No. 200 of the 1979-80
Regular Session of the Legislature. Any other action or proceeding
described in subdivision (a) shall be commenced within one year after
the cause of action arises unless a shorter period is otherwise provided
by statute.
(c) The supeiF district court or a court of appeals shall give
preference to the actions or proceedings described in this section over
all civil actions or proceedings pending in the court. The supeiio
district court shall commence hearing any such action or proceeding
within six months after the commencement of the action or
proceeding, provided that any such hearing may be delayed by joint
stipulation of the parties or at the discretion of the court for good
cause shown. The provisions of this section shall supersede any
provisions of law requiring courts to give preference to other civil
actions or proceedings. The provisions of this subdivision may be
enforced by mandamus.
(d) The Supreme Court shall, upon the request of any party,
transfer to itself, before a decision in the court of appeal, any appeal
or petition for extraordinary relief from an action or proceeding
described in this section, unless the Supreme Court determines that
the action or proceeding is unlikely to substantially affect (1) the
296
1993 / Trial Court Unification: Proposed Amendments and Commentary
construction, operation, or maintenance of the peripheral canal unit
described in subdivision (a) of Section 11255 of the Water Code, (2)
compliance with subdivision (b) of Section 11460 of the Water Code,
(3) compliance with the permanent agreement specified in Section
11256 of the Water Code, or (4) compliance with the provisions of the
contracts entered into pursuant to Section 11456 of the Water Code.
The request for transfer shall receive preference on the Supreme
Court's calendar. If the action or proceeding is transferred to the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court shall commence to hear the
matter within six months of the transfer unless the parties by joint
stipulation request additional time or the court, for good cause shown,
grants additional time.
(e) The remedy prescribed by the court for an action or proceeding
described in paragraph (4), (5), or (6) of subdivision (a) shall include,
but need not be limited to, compliance with subdivision (b) of Section
11460 of the Water Code, the permanent agreement specified in
Section 11256 of the Water Code, or the provisions of the contracts
entered into pursuant to Section 11456 of the Water Code.
(f) The Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento may
apply to the State Board of Control for actual costs imposed by the
requirements of this section upon the county, and the State Board of
Control shall pay such actual costs.
(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, nothing in this
Article shall be construed as prohibiting the Supreme Court from
exercising the transfer authority contained in Article VI, Section 12 of
the Constitution.
Comment
a. No substantive change. References to the "superior" court must be
changed to the "district" court.
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